Evolution Error And Intentionality
Tufts University 1. Preamble Sometimes it takes years of debate for philosophers to discover what it is they really disagree about. Sometimes they talk past each other in long series of books and articles, never guessing at the root disagreement that divides them. But occasionally a day comes when something happens to coax the cat out of the bag. "Aha!" one philosopher exclaims to another, "so that's why you've been disagreeing with me, misunderstanding me, resisting my conclusions, puzzling me all these years!" In the fall of 1985 I discovered what I took to be just such a submerged--perhaps even repressed--disagreement, and guessed that it might take some shock tactics to push this embarrassing secret into the harsh glare of philosophical attention. There are few things more shocking to philosophers than strange bedfellows, so, in an earlier draft of this chapter which circulated widely in 1986, I drew up some deliberately oversimplified battle lines, and picked sides--the good guys versus the bad guys. It worked. I was inundated with detailed, highly revealing responses from those I had challenged, and from others who rose to the bait. By and large these reactions confirmed both my division of the field and my claims for its unacknowledged importance. So constructive were the responses, however, even from those I had treated rather roughly--or misrepresented--in the earlier draft, that instead of just crowing "I told you so!" I should acknowledge at the outset that this heavily revised and expanded offspring of my earlier act of provocation owes a special debt to the comments of Tyler Burge, Fred Dretske, Jerry Fodor, John Haugeland, Saul Kripke, Ruth Millikan, Hilary Putnam, Richard Rorty, and Stephen Stich, and to many others, including especially: Fred Adams, Peter Brown, Jerome Feldman, D. K. Modrak, Carolyn Ristau, Jonathan Schull, Stephen White, and Andrew Woodfield. The Great Divide I want to display resists a simple, straightforward formulation, not surprisingly, but we can locate it by retracing the steps of my exploration, which began with a discovery about some philosophers' attitudes towards the interpretation of artifacts. The scales fell from my eyes during a discussion with Jerry Fodor and some other philosophers about a draft of a chapter of Fodo
ISBN:0-521-35944-9 1990 Article Bibliometrics ·Downloads (6 Weeks): n/a ·Downloads (12 Months): n/a ·Downloads (cumulative): n/a ·Citation Count: 0 Tools and Resources Save to Binder Export Formats: BibTeX EndNote ACMRef Share: https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/evolerr.htm | Author Tags knowledge representation and reasoning logic nonmonotonic, default reasoning and belief revision performance rule learning theory Contact Us | Switch to single page view (no tabs) **Javascript is not enabled http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=94264 and is required for the "tabbed view" or switch to the single page view** Powered by The ACM Digital Library is published by the Association for Computing Machinery. Copyright © 2016 ACM, Inc. Terms of Usage Privacy Policy Code of Ethics Contact Us Useful downloads: Adobe Reader QuickTime Windows Media Player Real Player Did you know the ACM DL App is now available? Did you know your Organization can subscribe to the ACM Digital Library? The ACM Guide to Computing Literature All Tags Export Formats Save to Binder
Error and IntentionalityArticle · April 1990 with 3 ReadsSource: OAI1st Daniel C. DennettAbstractSometimes it takes years of debate for philosophers to discover https://www.researchgate.net/publication/28762509_Evolution_Error_and_Intentionality what it is they really disagree about. Sometimes they talk past each other in long series of books and articles, never guessing at the root disagreement that divides them. But occasionally a day comes when something happens to coax the cat out of the bag. "Aha!" one philosopher exclaims to another, "so evolution error that's why you've been disagreeing with me, misunderstanding me, resisting my conclusions, puzzling me all these years!"Do you want to read the rest of this article?Request full-text CitationsCitations16ReferencesReferences0Making it mental: In search for the golden mean of the extended cognition controversy"Thus understood, Clark's skepticism seems to serve more as a general safety net, evolution error and something to fall upon when all else is lost, than a formidable ram with which to gore the opponent. 22 Dennett's (1987 and 1990) more radical claim that all content is extrinsic (response no. 1) has not, to my knowledge, been translated into a serious argument in favor of radical active externalism and has been criticized elsewhere (e.g., Aizawa and Adams 2005; Tecumseh Fitch 2007). This being the case, and since I find neither of these skeptical avenues convincing in the first place, I am content, for the time being, to leave things as they are. "[Show abstract] [Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: This paper engages the extended cognition controversy by advancing a theory which fits nicely into an attractive and surprisingly unoccupied conceptual niche situated comfortably between traditional individualism and the radical externalism espoused by the majority of supporters of the extended mind hypothesis. I call this theory moderate active externalism, or MAE. In alliance w
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