Human Error And Information System Failure
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Human Error In Information Technology
this blog post for more information. Close ScienceDirectSign inSign in what is human error in computers using your ScienceDirect credentialsUsernamePasswordRemember meForgotten username or password?Sign in via your institutionOpenAthens loginOther institution loginHelpJournalsBooksRegisterJournalsBooksRegisterSign inHelpcloseSign in
Examples Of Human Error In Information Technology
using your ScienceDirect credentialsUsernamePasswordRemember meForgotten username or password?Sign in via your institutionOpenAthens loginOther institution login Help Direct export Export file RIS(for EndNote, Reference Manager, human error in information security ProCite) BibTeX Text RefWorks Direct Export Content Citation Only Citation and Abstract Advanced search JavaScript is disabled on your browser. Please enable JavaScript to use all the features on this page. JavaScript is disabled on your browser. Please enable JavaScript to use all the features on this page. This page uses JavaScript human error cyber security to progressively load the article content as a user scrolls. Click the View full text link to bypass dynamically loaded article content. View full text Interacting with ComputersVolume 11, Issue 6, June 1999, Pages 699–720 Human error and information systems failure: the case of the London ambulance service computer-aided despatch system projectPaul Beynon-Davies, Computer Studies Department, University of Glamorgan, Pontypridd CF37 1DL, Mid-Glamorgan, Wales, UKAvailable online 12 July 1999AbstractHuman error and systems failure have been two constructs that have become linked in many contexts. In this paper we particularly focus on the issue of failure in relation to that group of software systems known as information systems. We first review the extant theoretical and empirical work on this topic. Then we discuss one particular well-known case — that of the London ambulance service computer-aided despatch system (Lascad) project — and use it as a particularly cogent example of the features of information systems failure. We maintain that the tendency
on Slideshare Security Intelligence Analysis and Insight for Information Security Professionals Toggle navigation Search for: Search Expand News Topics Industries X-Force Research Media Events & Webinars Home > Topics > CISO > The Role of Human Error in Successful Security Attacks The Role of
Human Error Vs Computer Error
Human Error in Successful Security Attacks September 2, 2014 | By Fran Howarth Share The data breach human error Role of Human Error in Successful Security Attacks on Twitter Share The Role of Human Error in Successful Security Attacks on Facebook
How To Reduce Human Error In The Workplace
Share The Role of Human Error in Successful Security Attacks on LinkedIn Share The Role of Human Error in Successful Security Attacks on Twitter Share The Role of Human Error in Successful Security Attacks on Facebook Share http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0953543898000502 The Role of Human Error in Successful Security Attacks on LinkedIn All humans make mistakes. One of the most intriguing findings from IBM's "2014 Cyber Security Intelligence Index" is that 95 percent of all security incidents involve human error. Many of these are successful security attacks from external attackers who prey on human weakness in order to lure insiders within organizations to unwittingly provide them with access to sensitive information. These mistakes are costly https://securityintelligence.com/the-role-of-human-error-in-successful-security-attacks/ since they involve insiders who often have access to the most sensitive information. According to research by Federal Computer Week cited in a recent Vormetric report, the greatest impacts of successful security attacks involving insiders are exposure of sensitive data, theft of intellectual property and the introduction of malware. The research also reported that 59 percent of respondents agree that most information technology security threats that directly result from insiders are the result of innocent mistakes rather than malicious abuse of privileges. The Threats of Inadvertent Human Error by Insider Mistakes One of the leading errors made by insiders is sending sensitive documents to unintended recipients. This is relatively easy to solve by deploying security controls to monitor sensitive information being leaked out of the organization. Once considered complex to deploy, these controls have been made considerably easier to implement by vendors in recent years. This has dramatically reduced the level of user involvement required and increased the use of such controls. These tools can also prevent users from engaging in inappropriate behavior, such as sending documents home via email or placing them on file-sharing sites or removable media such as USB sticks. Lost or stolen mobile devices are also a major concern that is exacerbated by the growing trend toward the use of personal devices. Again, there is techn
THE ACM1 In 1988, the Soviet Union's Phobos 1 satellite was lost on its way to Mars. Why? According to Science magazine, http://www.jnd.org/dn.mss/commentary_human_er.html "not long after the launch, a ground controller omitted a single letter in a series of digital commands sent to the spacecraft. And by malignant bad luck, that omission http://www.whsc.emory.edu/_pubs/momentum/2000fall/onpoint.html caused the code to be mistranslated in such a way as to trigger the test sequence" (the test sequence was stored in ROM, but was intended to be human error used only during checkout of the spacecraft while on the ground) [7]. Phobos went into a tumble from which it never recovered. What a strange report. "Malignant bad luck"? Why bad luck: why not bad design? Wasn't the problem the design of the command language that allowed such a simple deviant event to have such serious consequences. The human error in effects of electrical noise on signal detectability, identification, and reliability are well known. Designers are expected to use error-detecting and correcting codes. Suppose interference from known sources of electromagnetic noise had corrupted the signal to Phobos. We would not blame the ground controllers: we would say that the system designers did not follow standard engineering practice, and we would reconsider the design of the system so as to protect against this problem in the future. People err. That is a fact of life. People are not precision machinery designed for accuracy. In fact, we humans are a different kind of device entirely. Creativity, adaptability, and flexibility are our strengths. Continual alertness and precision in action or memory are our weaknesses. We are amazingly error tolerant, even when physically damaged. We are extremely flexible, robust, and creative, superb at finding explanations and meanings from partial and noisy evidence. The same properties that lead to such robustness and creativity also produce errors. The natural tendency to interpret partial information -- although of
occur annually as a result of medical errors in US hospitals. These numbers, if accurate, would make hospitals the eighth leading cause of death in America and do not even include medical errors in the outpatient setting. This would rank the lethality of US hospitals ahead of motor vehicle accidents, breast cancer, and AIDS. Very little controversy greeted the IOM report when it was released last November. To a large extent the initial reaction was, "yes, we can and should strive to reduce errors." The accuracy of the numbers was viewed as perhaps not so important. The areas of greatest controversy continue to center on error reporting, especially liability protection and whether error reporting should be mandatory or voluntary. In the months since the release of the IOM report, many questions about the data have arisen. How accurate are the data? What exactly constitutes a medical "error?" Is the death rate due to medical errors really analogous to a large jetliner falling out of the sky every day or two? Understanding the data allows us to put both the report and its criticisms in perspective. Two studies form the nucleus of the IOM report. Interestingly, neither study is new. The 1991 Harvard Medical Practice Study reviewed hospitalizations in 1984 and identified 98,000 deaths related to errors. A 1992 study in Colorado and Utah extrapolated 44,000 annual deaths. In these two studies, respectively, 3.7% and 2.9% of hospital admissions incurred an "adverse event," or, in other words, an event resulting from medical care rather than from the underlying disease. The Harvard study identified 19% of the adverse events as drug related, while 14% were wound infections and 13%, technical complications. Overall, 58% of the adverse events identified in this study were labeled "preventable." Both core studies used retrospective chart review to identify errors. It is clear that errors are underreported and that such review is necessary to ascertain the true rate of "preventable adverse events." This latter term is used synonymously wit