Human Error With Computers
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Human Error Vs Computer Error
Jun, 2007 New DTI report finds that most people never change their password. A examples of human error in information technology third write them down on paper. The biggest risk to an organisation's network security is human error, according to a new report.
Human Error Threat To Information Security
The research by the Department of Trade and Industry found that over a third of respondents either wrote down their password on a piece of paper or recorded it somewhere on their computer. The study also how to reduce human error in the workplace found that nearly two-thirds of the 1800 UK adults questioned said they never changed their passwords. Minister for Science and Innovation Malcolm Wicks said that the survey found that a large number of people were "careless with passwords, unwittingly exposing themselves and their company to fraud and theft." He added that the UK lost £440 million to credit card fraud last year and that 62 per cent of companies experienced a network how to prevent human error security incident. Wicks said that this was a problem that needed to be fixed. "Network security is also a major growth area where the UK has a good opportunity to become a global leader if we develop new technology to give us a competitive edge," said Wicks. The department has embarked on four projects aimed at increasing network security by cutting down the risk of human error. Each of the projects will use behavioural science to tackle human error. The DTI has given the projects £4 million in total. Among the successful projects are a project, run by BAE Systems and Loughborough University aimed at developing new ways of assessing an organisation's security risk and the human factors involved. Also, another project run by HP, Merrill Lynch, the University of Bath, the University of Newcastle and University College London will develop a predictive framework to assess the effectiveness security policies that regulate interactions between people and information systems. The other two projects will look at digital communication analysis to look for potential security threats and tools to identify human vulnerabilities in network security. The projects are part of the DTI's Network Security Innovation Platform, which was set up to develop new ideas to improve network security. The DTI said that it estimated that developme
THE ACM1 In 1988, the Soviet Union's Phobos 1 satellite was lost on its way to Mars. Why? According to Science magazine, "not long after the launch, a ground controller omitted a single letter in a series of digital commands sent to
A Technical Examination Which Eliminates Possible Human Errors
the spacecraft. And by malignant bad luck, that omission caused the code to be mistranslated what are some basic guidelines for protecting your computer from security risk? in such a way as to trigger the test sequence" (the test sequence was stored in ROM, but was intended to be used only
Human Error Cyber Security
during checkout of the spacecraft while on the ground) [7]. Phobos went into a tumble from which it never recovered. What a strange report. "Malignant bad luck"? Why bad luck: why not bad design? Wasn't the problem the http://www.itpro.co.uk/115920/human-error-biggest-threat-to-computer-security design of the command language that allowed such a simple deviant event to have such serious consequences. The effects of electrical noise on signal detectability, identification, and reliability are well known. Designers are expected to use error-detecting and correcting codes. Suppose interference from known sources of electromagnetic noise had corrupted the signal to Phobos. We would not blame the ground controllers: we would say that the system designers did not follow standard engineering practice, and we would http://www.jnd.org/dn.mss/commentary_human_er.html reconsider the design of the system so as to protect against this problem in the future. People err. That is a fact of life. People are not precision machinery designed for accuracy. In fact, we humans are a different kind of device entirely. Creativity, adaptability, and flexibility are our strengths. Continual alertness and precision in action or memory are our weaknesses. We are amazingly error tolerant, even when physically damaged. We are extremely flexible, robust, and creative, superb at finding explanations and meanings from partial and noisy evidence. The same properties that lead to such robustness and creativity also produce errors. The natural tendency to interpret partial information -- although often our prime virtue -- can cause operators to misinterpret system behavior in such a plausible way that the misinterpretation can be difficult to discover. Quite a lot is known about human performance and the way it applies to system interaction [1]. Several classes of human error have been identified and studied and conditions that increase the likelihood of error can be specified in advance [3, 4, 5]. Communication systems can be designed to be error-tolerant and error-detecting or correcting. In a similar way, we could devise a science of error-tolerant, detecting or minimization interactions with human operators [2]. Many advances have been made in our understanding of the hardware and software of information processing systems, but one major gap
long after the launch, a ground controller omitted a single letter in a series of digital commands sent to the http://www.cogsci.ucsd.edu/~norman/DNMss/errordesign.html spacecraft. And by malignant bad luck, that omission caused the code to be mistranslated in such a way as to trigger the test sequence" (the test sequence was stored in ROM, but was intended to be used only during checkout of the spacecraft while on the ground) [7]. Phobos went into a tumble from which it never recovered. human error What a strange report. "Malignant bad luck"? Why bad luck: why not bad design? Wasn't the problem the design of the command language that allowed such a simple deviant event to have such serious consequences. The effects of electrical noise on signal detectability, identification, and reliability are well known. Designers are expected to use error-detecting and correcting codes. human error in Suppose interference from known sources of electromagnetic noise had corrupted the signal to Phobos. We would not blame the ground controllers: we would say that the system designers did not follow standard engineering practice, and we would reconsider the design of the system so as to protect against this problem in the future. People err. That is a fact of life. People are not precision machinery designed for accuracy. In fact, we humans are a different kind of device entirely. Creativity, adaptability, and flexibility are our strengths. Continual alertness and precision in action or memory are our weaknesses. We are amazingly error tolerant, even when physically damaged. We are extremely flexible, robust, and creative, superb at finding explanations and meanings from partial and noisy evidence. The same properties that lead to such robustness and creativity also produce errors. The natural tendency to interpret partial information -- although often our prime virtue -- can cause operators to misinterpret system behavior in such a plausible way that the misinterpretation can be difficult to discove