Openssl Ssl Error 5
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Related messages: [ Next message ] [ Previous message ] [ Maybe in reply to ] ssl_get_error error codes [ Next in thread ] [ Replies ] From: Naren D
Openssl Error Code 5
Ssl_error_syscall 5
you added 'errno' to that error message so see what kind of error the syscall might've set on return. [good-looking libcurl-using code cut out] -- Daniel Stenberg -- curl, cURL, Curl, CURL. Groks URLs. _____________________________________________________________ Get 25MB, POP3, Spam Filtering with LYCOS MAIL PLUS for $19.95/year. http://login.mail.lycos.com/brandPage.shtml?pageId=plus&ref=lmtplus ------------------------------------------------------- This SF.NET email is sponsored by: SourceForge Enterprise Edition + IBM + LinuxWorld = Something 2 See! http://www.vasoftware.com Received on 2003-01-10 This message: [ Message body ] Next message: Andy Cedilnik: "libcurl and socks5" Previous message: Daniel Stenberg: "Re: curl 7.10.3-pre6" Maybe in reply to: Daniel Stenberg: "Re: SSL read error: 5 - What could be the reson?" Next in thread: Daniel Stenberg: "Re: Re: SSL read error: 5 - What could be the reson?" Reply: Daniel Stenberg: "Re: Re: SSL read error: 5 - What could be the reson?" Contemporary messages sorted: [ by date ] [ by thread ] [ by subject ] [ by author ] [ by messages with attachments ]
*ssl, int ret); DESCRIPTION SSL_get_error() returns a result code (suitable for the C "switch" statement) for a preceding call to SSL_connect(), SSL_accept(), SSL_do_handshake(), SSL_read(), SSL_peek(), or SSL_write() on ssl. The ssl_read error 5 value returned by that TLS/SSL I/O function must be passed to SSL_get_error() openssl error queue in parameter ret. In addition to ssl and ret, SSL_get_error() inspects the current thread's OpenSSL error queue.
Ssl Accept Error 5
Thus, SSL_get_error() must be used in the same thread that performed the TLS/SSL I/O operation, and no other OpenSSL function calls should appear in between. The current thread's error queue https://curl.haxx.se/mail/lib-2003-01/0093.html must be empty before the TLS/SSL I/O operation is attempted, or SSL_get_error() will not work reliably. RETURN VALUES The following return values can currently occur: SSL_ERROR_NONE The TLS/SSL I/O operation completed. This result code is returned if and only if ret > 0. SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN The TLS/SSL connection has been closed. If the protocol version is SSL 3.0 or TLS https://www.openssl.org/docs/ssl/SSL_get_error.html 1.0, this result code is returned only if a closure alert has occurred in the protocol, i.e. if the connection has been closed cleanly. Note that in this case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN does not necessarily indicate that the underlying transport has been closed. SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ, SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE The operation did not complete; the same TLS/SSL I/O function should be called again later. If, by then, the underlying BIO has data available for reading (if the result code is SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) or allows writing data (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE), then some TLS/SSL protocol progress will take place, i.e. at least part of an TLS/SSL record will be read or written. Note that the retry may again lead to a SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ or SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE condition. There is no fixed upper limit for the number of iterations that may be necessary until progress becomes visible at application protocol level. For socket BIOs (e.g. when SSL_set_fd() was used), select() or poll() on the underlying socket can be used to find out when the TLS/SSL I/O function should be retried. Caveat: Any TLS/SSL I/O function can lead to ei
num); DESCRIPTION SSL_write() writes num bytes from the buffer buf into the specified ssl connection. NOTES If necessary, SSL_write() will negotiate a TLS/SSL session, if not already explicitly performed by SSL_connect or SSL_accept. If the peer requests https://www.openssl.org/docs/ssl/SSL_write.html a re-negotiation, it will be performed transparently during the SSL_write() operation. The behaviour of https://www.teskalabs.com/blog/heartbleed SSL_write() depends on the underlying BIO. For the transparent negotiation to succeed, the ssl must have been initialized to client or server mode. This is being done by calling SSL_set_connect_state or SSL_set_accept_state() before the first call to an SSL_read or SSL_write() function. If the underlying BIO is blocking, SSL_write() will only return, once the write error 5 operation has been finished or an error occurred, except when a renegotiation take place, in which case a SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ may occur. This behaviour can be controlled with the SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY flag of the SSL_CTX_set_mode call. If the underlying BIO is non-blocking, SSL_write() will also return, when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of SSL_write() to continue the operation. In this case a call to SSL_get_error with the return openssl ssl error value of SSL_write() will yield SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ or SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE. As at any time a re-negotiation is possible, a call to SSL_write() can also cause read operations! The calling process then must repeat the call after taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of SSL_write(). The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a non-blocking socket, nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check for the required condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue. SSL_write() will only return with success, when the complete contents of buf of length num has been written. This default behaviour can be changed with the SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE option of SSL_CTX_set_mode. When this flag is set, SSL_write() will also return with success, when a partial write has been successfully completed. In this case the SSL_write() operation is considered completed. The bytes are sent and a new SSL_write() operation with a new buffer (with the already sent bytes removed) must be started. A partial write is performed with the size of a message block, which is 16kB for SSLv3/TLSv1. WARNING When an SSL_write() operation has to be repeated because of SSL_ERROR_WANT
on Censys weekly Heartbleed scan report, [1] we found that more than 30,000 out of the top one million domains [2] are still vulnerable. [3][4] Censys tested one million top sites, but there are more than one billion websites on the Internet. [5] If we assume that at around 43% of websites offer HTTPS connections [6], and the percentage of the vulnerability will be the same for the remaining 999 millions of websites (probably not and the results will be worse), we have 15 millions of vulnerable servers. This is a big number for hackers and cyber attackers to inflict damage to those server operators. We are surprised that the number is that high. Now we have proof that a security vulnerability remains with us for a long time, maybe almost forever even when there exist patches and fixes. The Internet is a battlefield among the good, the bad, and the ugly. Who has better attacking or defending technology wins. We hope that the number of vulnerable servers will be almost zero in the next five years. Are we optimistic? What do you think? Update (10th April 2014): Original content of this blog entry stated that one of our SeaCat servers detected a "Heartbleed" bug attack prior its actual disclosure. EFF [7] correctly pointed out that there are other tools that can produce the same pattern in the SeaCat server log. [8] I don't have any hard data evidence to support or reject this statement. Since there is a risk that our finding is a false positive, I have modified this entry to a neutral tone and have removed any conclusions. There are real honeypots on the Internet that should provide final evidence when Heartbleed is broadly exploited for the first time. Please also see another update attached to the end of this post. There is a lot of attention surrounding this entry. Original article (7th April 2014) Today, on the 7th April 2014, a serious vulnerability in the popular OpenSSL has been discovered and published. This bug is especially nasty since it can disclose important secret information in an undetectable way. SeaCat server is using OpenSSL and therefore it is exposed to this vulnerability. However, thanks to very selective SSL handshake implementation, it seems that SeaCat server rejects to respond to a TLS heartbeat request until authorisation is completed making it resistant to this threat. Every fresh distribution of the SeaCat server uses a fixed version of OpenSSL, mitigating this issue completely. The SeaCat client for iOS and Java/Android is not affected since it uses other SSL implementation than OpenSSL (platform specific) and i